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Abstract
In April 2013, the UK implemented a dual-regulation approach to financial
services often referred to as twin peaks. In this paper, we assess the impact
of the introduction of twin peaks regulation on the systemic risk contribu-
tions of UK financial institutions. Using a matched sample of single- and
dual-regulated financial institutions, we provide evidence that twin peaks
regulation resulted in a relative reduction in systemic risk for dual-regulated
firms.
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1. Introduction
The global financial crisis, beginning from 2007, exposed the fragility of
the financial system and highlighted the potential for economic instability
resulting from systemic risk. In response to this crisis, sweeping changes to
the landscape underpinning financial regulation have been proposed. Central
to this emerging regulatory reorientation is the organizational structure of
financial regulators, often blamed for sowing the seeds of the crisis. In the
United Kingdom, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) has been heavily
criticized for deficiencies in safeguarding the financial system prior to the
crisis. The Turner Report suggests that the failure of the FSA “to spot
emerging issues was rooted in the paucity of macro-prudential, systemic-
and system-wide analysis.”
Following on the path of early adopters such as Australia and the Nether-
lands, the UK introduced a so-called twin peaks approach to financial regula-
tion in 2013. The idea of twin peaks regulation was first proposed by Taylor
(1995) and denotes a division between prudential regulatory supervision and
conduct of business supervision. This separation is grounded in an expec-
tation that a delineation of responsibilities will reduce conflicts of interest,
create clear objectives for each regulator and alleviate the danger that one
aspect of regulation monopolizes attention (Godwin et al., 2016). In the UK,
FSA regulation has been replaced by two separate agencies, the Prudential
Regulation Authority (PRA), with responsibility to ensure safety and sound-
ness for the firms it regulates and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA),
responsible for promoting effective competition, ensuring that relevant mar-
kets function well and for conduct regulation of all financial services firms
(Financial Services Act 2012). At the heart of the twin peaks approach, pru-
dential regulation, referred to by Nier (2009) as “systemic risk regulation,”
focuses primarily on the harm that firms can cause to the financial system.
The objective of this paper is to provide an initial assessment of whether
the concentrated focus on prudential regulation under the twin peaks regime
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resulted in a change to systemic risk for dual regulated firms.
Our identification strategy takes advantage of the 2013 change in UK
regulatory structure. Prior to this, financial institutions were regulated for
both prudential supervision and financial conduct by the FSA. Post treat-
ment, certain financial firms are subject to twin peaks regulation by two
separate entities, the PRA and FCA. In contrast, others are regulated for
both prudential and conduct issues by a single regulator, the FCA. Focusing
on listed financial institutions and matching using propensity scores, we get
a control group of single-regulator firms that look like those which are dual-
regulated. A difference-in-differences analysis then demonstrates that, while
treated and untreated firms have similar trends in systemic risk prior to the
introduction of twin peaks regulation, after treatment a relative reduction in
systemic risk for treated firms is observed.
Our paper makes a number of contributions. First, we build on litera-
ture assessing the appropriate regulatory architecture for the financial sector
(Gaganis and Pasiouras, 2013; Boyer and Ponce, 2012; Dincer and Eichen-
green, 2012). Specifically, our identification strategy allows us to isolate the
extent to which a change in regulatory architecture impacts systemic risk.
Second, we build upon the systemic risk literature, specifically that focused
upon ways to reduce such risks (Anginer et al., 2014; Gauthier et al., 2012).
Our finding of reduced systemic risk under the twin peaks regulatory architec-
ture echoes previous work highlighting the central importance of regulation
in limiting systemic risk (Bostandzic and Weiss, 2018; Weiss et al., 2014).
Finally, our paper contributes some initial empirical evidence to the nascent
literature debating the merits of twin peaks regulation.
2. Empirical Design
2.1. Model
To examine the impact of the introduction of twin peaks regulation on sys-
temic risk, we employ a difference-in-differences (Diff-in-Diff) setup, compar-
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ing systemic risk changes of dual-regulated financial institutions with changes
in such risk for a similar group of institutions that are not dual-regulated.
We estimate model specifications that are variants of the following form:
SRi,t = δ0 + δ1Treatedi + δ2Postt + δ3Treatedi × Postt + FE + i,t (1)
where SRi,t is the estimate of systemic risk for institution i at time t. Treated
is a treatment group indicator equalling 1 for financial institutions that are
dual regulated by FCA and PRA, and 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy indica-
tor that equalling 1 after the twin peaks implementation (i.e., 2013Q2 and
onward) and 0 otherwise. FE refers to firm and quarter fixed effects. The
coefficient of interest is δ3, which measures the difference-in-changes in sys-
temic risk for financial institutions that are dual regulated relative to those
that are not. If δ3 is statistically significant, the introduction of twin peaks
regulation has an impact on systemic risk for treated financial institutions.
The Diff-in-Diff approach ensures model estimation is not biased by perma-
nent and unobserved differences between the treated and control group or by
common trends.
2.2. Systemic Risk Measures
We employ the following quantitative measures for systemic risk: Marginal
Expected Shortfall (MES), SRISK, and ∆CoVaR. Following Acharya et al.
(2012), we compute MES as follows:
MESit = −E[Rit|Rmt 6 qα] (2)
where Rit denotes the daily stock return of institution i at time t; R
m
t repre-
sents the daily financial services sector market return at time t; and qα is the
α quantile of market return. Setting α=5%, MES is measured as the average
firm return during the 5% worst return days for the financial services industry
in a quarter. MES quantifies the extent to which an individual institution’s
stock returns are low when market returns are low.
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We calculate SRISK (Brownlees and Engle, 2017), a conditional capital
shortfall measure of systemic risk, representing the capital that institution i
requires to weather a financial crisis:
SRISKit = kDebt
i
t − (1− k)(1− LRMESit)× Equityit (3)
where k is the prudential capital ratio which equals 8%, Debtit the debt of
institution i at time t and Equityit the book value of equity of institution i at
time t. LRMESit is the long-run marginal expected shortfall (Acharya et al.,
2012) when the financial services sector returns are below –2%, calculated as
follows:
LRMESit = 1− exp(−18× (−E[Rit|Rmt < −2%])) (4)
We also follow Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) to estimate the time-
varying ∆CoVaRt for each institution at 5% and 1% levels. Our estimation
is based on quantile regressions using daily data.
X it = α
i + γiMt−1 + it (5)
Xsystemt = α




where X it is the daily return on the market-valued total assets of institution
i at time t; Xsystemt is the daily return of the financial system, calculated
as the market value weighted average change in asset values for financial
institutions. Mt−1 is a set of state variables analogous to those suggested by
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016).1
1The state variables employed are 1) Change in the three-month Treasury bill rate; 2)
Change in the yield curve slope, calculated as the spread between the ten-year government
bond yield and the three-month Treasury bill rate; 3) A UK specific “TED spread”, calcu-
lated as the difference between three-month GBP LIBOR rate and three-month Treasury
bill rates; 4) Change in the credit spread between BOFA’s BAA-rated bonds and the ten-
year government bond yield; 5) Market return of MSCI UK index; 6) Real estate sector
return in excess of the financial services sector return; and 7) Equity volatility, computed
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From estimation of equations (5) and (6) we obtain:




















q are coefficients obtained from quantile
regressions at the 1% and 5% confidence levels. ∆CoV aRit(q), which mea-
sures the marginal contribution of institution i to the risk of the system at
time t, is computed as the difference between CoV aRit(q) conditional on the
distress of the institution (i.e., q=1% or 5%) and CoV aRit(50%) (i.e., the
normal state of the institution).
(9)∆CoV aRit(q) = CoV aR
i
t(q)− CoV aRit(50%)
We obtain daily ∆CoV aRit(q) from the quantile regressions. Since we obtain
financial data for each financial institution from Compustat Fundamentals
Quarterly, we create the quarterly time-series ∆CoV aRit(q) and V aR
i
t(q) by
taking the mean of ∆CoV aRit(q) and V aR
i
t(q) for each firm-quarter. To
ensure consistency among the systemic risk measures, we scale V aRit(q) and
∆CoV aRit(q) by –1 such that higher values correspond to greater risk.
2.3. Sample
Systemic risk is calculated using daily stock data from 2011Q2 to 2015Q2
for all UK publicly traded banks, broker-dealers, insurance companies, and
investment firms (SIC 6020–6411). We obtain the list of institutions that are
regulated by both FCA and PRA from the Bank of England.2 Daily stock
data are obtained from Compustat Global Security Daily and accounting
data from Compustat Fundamentals Quarterly. To ensure sufficient data to
as the 22-day rolling standard deviation of daily equity market returns.




calculate systemic risk a number of exclusions are employed.3 The resulting
sample consists of 151 financial firms incorporated in the UK. Twin peaks
regulation was implemented from April 1st 2013.
The key assumption for obtaining reliable Diff-in-Diff estimates is the
parallel trend assumption. That is, in the absence of treatment, the average
outcome for treated and control groups should follow parallel paths over time.
To deal with selection concerns, we perform propensity score matching in the
pre-treatment period (i.e., 2011Q2–2012Q4) to construct a control group of
FCA-regulated institutions that look like those which are dual regulated.
The propensity score, p(Xi), is the probability of receiving treatment given
a vector of covariates Xi, p(Xi) = Pr(Ti = 1|Xi) and estimated using logit.
We match on quarter and institution type (i.e., first 2 digits of SIC code)
using a set of matching covariates including book value of assets, market
capitalization, trading volume, idiosyncratic volatility, MES, V aR(5) and
∆CoV aR(5). We perform radius matching that considers all non-treated
observations within a specified radius (0.1) around a treated firm’s propensity
to be dual regulated as control units. Radius matching allows for higher
precision than nearest neighbor matching (Huber et al., 2013). Matching is
performed with replacement, which means that each non-treated firm can
be used as a neighbor for multiple treated firms.4 The resulting matched
sample comprises 16 treated firms and 61 control firms. Table 1 reports the
balancing properties of the matching covariates. No statistically significant
differences are found between the two samples, providing support for balance
between treatment and control samples.
3We exclude institutions as follows 1) those which are active for less than 60 trading
days in a quarter, 2) those with zero growth in market-valued total assets for more than 60
consecutive trading days in a quarter, 3) returns that are larger than 7 standard deviations,
and 4) those come into existence after the treatment year.
4Smith and Todd (2005) suggest that this specification should improve accuracy of the
matching procedure.
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[Table 1 about here.]
3. Results
We use the matched sample to analyze the difference in systemic risk
between treated and control firms. Table 2 reports results of the Diff-in-Diff
analysis that compares the evolution of systemic risk of treated firms with
that from a control group of firms. Standard errors, unless otherwise stated,
are clustered at firm level (Petersen, 2009). We use four measures for systemic
risk, as detailed in columns 1 to 4 of Table 2. The interaction term is found
to be significant and negative across these measures, which indicates that the
introduction of twin peaks regulation has been effective in reducing systemic
risk overall. An exception is SRISK, where the sample is much reduced due
to the availability of accounting data required for estimation. The expected
negative sign is found but the t-statistics do not indicate significance.
The finding of altered systemic risk is depicted in Figure 1, which shows
the evolution of average systemic risk for the treated and control firms be-
tween 2011Q2 and 2015Q2. Both groups have a very similar trend in their
contribution to systemic risk in the pre-treatment period, decreasing by
around 50% in the period following the sovereign debt crisis. In the post-
treatment period, systemic risk increases for both treated and control firms,
but while the control increases by over 130%, we observe only an increase of
about 5% for treated firms up to 2015Q2. In columns 5 and 6 of Table 2,
we also isolate the impact on firm-specific VaR (equation 7), showing that
treated firms present reduced tail-risk post treatment.
[Table 2 about here.]
[Figure 1 about here.]
Prior studies suggest that larger banks have significantly higher systemic
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risk (Laeven et al., 2016). For this reason, we further employ a capitalization-
weighted least squares specification to account for possible larger contribu-
tions to systemic risk by bigger institutions. The weight is calculated as an
institution’s average quarterly capitalization divided by the average financial
sector total capitalization in the same quarter. Results in Table 3 provide
further support for the baseline findings, with an overall increase in the level
of significance and statistical power of the test. In particular, SRISK results
are now found to have the correct sign and to be significant.
[Table 3 about here.]
4. Concluding Remarks
Consequent to the global financial crisis, the architecture of financial reg-
ulation has been comprehensively reformed, with a recent focus on the form
of the regulating authorities. In an attempt to ensure that regulators have
specific objectives and to reduce the potential for regulatory trade-offs, the
UK introduced the so-called twin-peaks regulatory system from April 2013.
Central to this approach is a concentrated focus on systemic risk by the pru-
dential regulator. Using the split between single- and dual-regulated financial
firms in the UK, we identify a significant beneficial impact of twin-peaks reg-
ulation on systemic risk in this jurisdiction.
As highlighted by Schoenmaker and Veron (2018), the majority of Euro-
pean countries maintain an integrated financial supervision structure. While
direct cross-border inference from our results may be difficult due to differ-
ences in facets such as regulation, law and culture, our findings provide an ini-
tial indication regarding the potential for a relative reduction in systemic risk
for firms subject to dual regulation. Building upon previous research which
has qualitatively debated the merits of the various organizational structures
underpinning financial regulation, our contribution lies in the quantitative
assessment of twin peaks effectiveness in countering systemic risk.
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Figure 1: Evolution of Systemic Risk (MES) for Treated Group and Control Group
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Table 1: Balancing property of the matching covariates
Treated Control Difference t-statistic p-value
Book Value of Assets 8.097 7.642 0.455 1.14 0.257
Market Capitalization 13.727 13.406 0.321 0.99 0.322
Trading Volume 5.054 3.164 1.890 0.75 0.455
Idiosyncratic Volatility 0.013 0.013 -0.001 -0.63 0.531
MES 0.017 0.017 0.001 0.24 0.808
VaR(5) 2.849 2.975 -0.126 -0.60 0.546
∆CoVaR(5) 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.77 0.444
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Table 2: Difference-in-differences results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MES SRISK –∆CoVaR(1) –∆CoVaR(5) –VaR(1) –VaR(5)
Treated×Post -0.005** -0.001 -0.002** -0.002** -0.645* -0.536*
[-2.350] [-1.312] [-2.474] [-2.557] [-1.862] [-1.793]
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster SE Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Observations 1,211 542 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200
R-squared 0.431 0.771 0.711 0.773 0.369 0.462
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; [Robust t-statistics in brackets]
Table 3: Capitalization-weighted least squares difference-in-differences results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MES SRISK –∆CoVaR(1) –∆CoVaR(5) –VaR(1) –VaR(5)
Treated×Post -0.007** -0.006* -0.005*** -0.005*** -1.078*** -0.978**
[-2.023] [-1.986] [-3.017] [-3.185] [-2.696] [-2.621]
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster SE Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Observations 1,211 542 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200
R-squared 0.670 0.772 0.737 0.797 0.537 0.675
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; [Robust t-statistics in brackets]
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